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Abstract—Real time bidding (RTB) enables demand side plat-
forms (bidders) to scale ad campaigns across multiple publishers
affiliated to an RTB ad exchange. While driving multiple cam-
paigns for mobile app install ads via RTB, the bidder typically has
to: (i) maintain each campaign’s efficiency (i.e., meet advertiser’s
target cost-per-install), (ii) be sensitive to advertiser’s budget,
and (iii) make profit after payouts to the ad exchange. In this
process, there is a sense of delayed rewards for the bidder’s
actions; the exchange charges the bidder right after the ad is
shown, but the bidder gets to know about resultant installs after
considerable delay. This makes it challenging for the bidder to
decide beforehand the bid (and corresponding cost charged to
advertiser) for each ad display opportunity. To jointly handle
the objectives mentioned above, we propose a state space based
policy which decides the exchange bid and advertiser cost for
each opportunity. The state space captures the current efficiency,
budget utilization and profit. The policy based on this state space
is trained on past decisions and outcomes via a novel Q-learning
algorithm which accounts for the delay in install notifications.
In our experiments based on data from app install campaigns
managed by Yahoo’s Gemini advertising platform, the Q-learning
based policy led to a significant increase in the profit and number
of efficient campaigns.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the revenue generated from ads for mobile apps
was more than 33 billion USD [1]. This is not surprising given
that there are over 5 million apps (in Google PlayStore and
Apple App Store) [2], and most apps struggle to achieve a
large user base. To attract more users, apps naturally resort
to online advertising platforms. Such platforms (e.g., Yahoo’s
Gemini [3]), drive app install campaigns by showing ads on
owned-and-operated properties (e.g., Yahoo mail, Tumblr and
Yahoo Finance in case of Gemini) as well as third party
publishers via an external RTB ad exchange (e.g., MoPub).
Such RTB ad exchanges offer diversity and scale for app
install advertisers; but they also introduce new challenges as
described below.
In an RTB ad exchange, multiple bidders participate in
an auction for each ad display request issued by a publisher
(via the exchange). Each bidder could be managing multiple
campaigns at the same time, and showing ads across mul-
tiple publishers through the exchange. In practice, there is
considerable heterogeneity across publishers in terms of ad
request volume, audience quality and auction floor prices. The
bidder’s profit also keeps evolving over time, and so do the
efficiencies across campaigns (depending on costs charged to
advertisers). So when a bidder selects a campaign for an ad
request, while deciding how much should it bid and how much
should it charge the advertiser, it naturally faces the question:
is my bid and cost for the campaign worth it given the pub-
lisher, my current profit and the campaign’s current efficiency?
Sensitivity to advertiser’s budget adds yet another constraint
for the bidder. Intuitively, feedback from past decisions and
outcomes can assist the bidder in coming up with better future
decisions amidst the challenges mentioned above. However,
unlike regular cost-per-click (CPC) ads [4] where feedback
(click/no-click) is fast, in the case of app install ads there can
be considerable delays in knowing whether the user installed
the app after clicking on the ad. The delay stems from the
following issue: after clicking an app install ad, the user is
typically taken to the Google PlayStore or Apple App Store
(external to the bidder, publisher and advertiser). The bidder
gets to know about the ad conversion (install) only when
the user opens the installed app for the first time (typically
conveyed by the app advertiser or third parties). Such delays
can span days as shown in Figure 1 (for app install ads
managed by Yahoo Gemini).
Fig. 1. Conversion delay distribution for app installs, i.e., the time between
click and first use of the app (for app install ads managed by Yahoo Gemini).
Majority of the conversions are received within 2 days of the click.
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Current RTB literature focuses on just some of the above
mentioned objectives. In [5], [6] the focus is purely on
profit maximization; whereas [7] focuses purely on campaign
efficiency. In the context of learning from past decisions and
outcomes, [8] employed value iteration (a form of reinforce-
ment learning [9]) to solely optimize for campaign efficiency
for CPC ads. In fact, the notion of campaign efficiency
(i.e., the discrepancy in cost-per-action delivered versus the
advertiser’s target cost-per-action) in current RTB literature is
mostly oriented towards clicks as actions; this does not involve
feedback delays as described above for app installs. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to address both profit
and campaign efficiency a coupled manner, specifically in the
context of app install ads. We develop a state space framework,
and leverage Q-learning [9] (also a form of reinforcement
learning) to learn from the outcomes of past decisions. Our
main contributions can be summarized as listed below:
1) a state space approach which encompasses campaign’s
efficiency, advertiser’s budget and bidder’s profit,
2) a Q-learning algorithm to learn a state space based
policy for determining the bid at the exchange and cost
charged to advertiser for each ad request. The novelty
lies in our design of the reward function which accounts
for feedback delays.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
covers the paper’s setup, and problem formulation. In Sec-
tion III we discuss our state state approach in Section IV
we explain the proposed Q-learning algorithm. Finally, in
Section V, we describe our experimental results based on
mobile app install ads data from Yahoo Gemini [3].
II. SETUP
In this section, we first provide some background on online
advertising via RTB. This is followed by a description of the
exact setup considered in this paper and underlying objectives.
Our setup is fairly standard in the online advertising industry
[4], and resembles the Yahoo Gemini offering for app install
advertisers; the primary motivation behind this paper.
A. Online advertising via RTB
In RTB, several bidders participate at an ad exchange,
and bid for ad display opportunities provided by publishers
affiliated to the exchange. The typical sequence of events
that takes place during an RTB auction can be described
as follows. When a user visits a publisher (e.g., website,
app), the publisher conveys an ad display opportunity to the
exchange; this includes details like the user’s identifier (e.g.,
mobile IDFA or AAID) and floor price for the auction. The
ad exchange then relays this information to the bidders. At
this stage, an interested bidder finds the best matching ad
(from its current list of campaigns). Such a match might
be based on the predicted click-through-rate (pCTR, i.e.,
P (click|impression)), and predicted conversion/install rate
(pCVR, i.e., P (install|click)) associated with the display
opportunity; in particular, details on ranking app install ads
via pCTR and pCVR models can be found in [10]. Having
selected the best ad for the opportunity, the bidder decides:
(i) its bid at the auction, and (ii) the corresponding cost to be
charged to the advertiser. If the bidder wins in the (second-
price) auction [4], it has to pay the exchange only if its ad is
shown to the user (i.e., receives impression). However, under
the CPC pricing model [4], the bidder can charge the advertiser
(i.e., the determined cost) only if an user clicks on the shown
ad.
Although an app install advertiser is charged for clicks,
it is typically interested in campaign efficiency. Efficiency η
is defined as
actual CPI
target CPI
, where CPI stands for cost-per-
install (i.e., the app-install equivalent of cost-per-action). The
actual CPI is the total cost charged to the advertiser divided
by total installs received. To capture a notion of satisfaction
across all app-install advertisers associated with a bidder, we
define happy campaigns as the count of campaigns with η
below 1 + , where  represents the tolerance relative to
the target CPI provided by advertisers. The differences in
when the bidder is charged versus the advertiser is charged,
and the observation that the app-install advertiser is more
concerned about CPI than CPC, leave quite some room for the
bidder to optimize its bid and cost decisions for each display
opportunity.
B. Problem formulation
We consider a bidder which is handling N app-install ad
campaigns; campaign i has a target CPI∗i and budget Bi
for time horizon T (same across campaigns). The (sole) ad
exchange, with which the bidder interacts, is associated with
M publishers. The bidder’s cumulative spend on publisher j
at time t is denoted by spendj,t, and represents the amount
paid by the bidder to the exchange for the impressions shown
on publisher j. Similarly, we denote the cumulative advertiser
cost (across all advertisers) charged for ads shown on publisher
j by costj,t. The margin mj,t is defined as
costj,t − spendj,t∑M
j=1 spendj,t
,
which is indicative of the relative profit/loss being made on
publisher j. The bidder’s goal is to maximize the number of
happy campaigns (with ηi,T < 1 +  ), and the overall margin
(i.e.,
∑M
j=1mj,T ) at the end of the time horizon, i.e., at t = T .
III. STATE SPACE APPROACH
We first describe an intuitive approach (in Section III-A)
which worked reasonably well in our experiments. Drawing
insights from this intuitive approach, we then describe the
detailed state space formulation in Section III-B; the proposed
Q-learning algorithm (in Section IV) is based on this state
space.
A. An intuitive approach
Consider a point of time t, where the bidder is placing a bid
for campaign i for an opportunity in publisher j. Assume that
the bidder had already computed the bid (at the exchange), and
the cost (to the advertiser) for this particular opportunity based
on data from the past. This could be the standard expected-
cost-per-impression (eCPM ) bid [3], [4] based on the pCTR
and pCVR associated with the opportunity (i.e., bid = eCPM
= Target CPI×pCVR×pCTR, and cost = Target CPI×pCVR).
But at this point of time, the bidder suddenly gets to know
the current publisher margin (mj,t), and campaign efficiency
(ηj,t), and has the option of update the bid and cost. An
intuitive approach to do so based on mj,t and ηj,t (and also
keeping in mind the goals outlined in Section II) would be as
shown in Figure 2. For example, when the current efficiency
negative m, good η
bid ↓ cost ↑
negative m, bad η
bid ↓ cost ↓
neutral m, good η
bid = cost ↑
neutral m, bad η
bid = cost ↓
positive m, good η
bid ↑ cost ↑
positive m, bad η
bid ↑ cost ↓
current efficiency ηi,t
current
margin
mj,t
good bad
negative
positive
neutral
ηi,t ≤ 1 +  ηi,t > 1 + 
mj,t < −δ
mj,t > δ
|mj,t| ≤ δ
Fig. 2. An intuitive approach for updating bid and cost based on current
publisher margin mj,t and current campaign efficiency ηj,t. The symbols ↑,
↓ and = stand for increase, decrease and no change respectively; δ,  > 0
represent the thresholds for good efficiency and positive margin.
is bad and margin is negative, the bidder is better off reducing
both its bid and cost. Increasing the bid would hurt the margin,
while increasing the cost would hurt the efficiency. But when
the margin is negative and efficiency is good, the bidder
can afford to charge the advertiser more (by increasing the
cost) while decreasing its bid for better margin. At a high
level, Figure 2 defines a discrete state space based on current
efficiency and margin, and then takes an intuitive step based
on the state. In Section III-B we generalize such a state space
approach, and later in Section IV, we show how one can
learn the best action (i.e., whether to decrease/increase and
the magnitude of change) for a particular state.
B. State space formulation
Drawing motivation from the intuitive approach in Sec-
tion III-A, we define a discrete state space S = Sm×Sη×SB ,
where Sm, Sη , and SB represent quantized publisher margin,
campaign efficiency, and campaign budget respectively. The
main features of such a state space are described below.
1) Quantization: Quantization is done on the basis of
domain knowledge. For margin, we consider a bin around zero
of the form (−∆m,∆m], and lm uniformly sized bins (width
2∆m) to the left and to the right of the ’zero’ bin (similar
to the quantization in Figure 2). For efficiency, we partition
the intervals (1 + , ηupper] and [0, 1 + ] into lη uniform
bins each (where ηupper is a predetermined upper bound).
For budget, the fraction of budget remaining is binned into
2lB uniformly spaced bins in the interval [0, 1]. As a result
of the above quantizations, we obtain a discrete state space
which not only captures our objectives, but also simplifies the
policy learning process (as described in Section IV). Also, the
granularity of the state space is such that it is not expensive
to infer the current state of the system; in a large scale setup
with thousands of campaigns and publishers, maintaining near
real time aggregates of publisher wise margins and campaign
wise costs is way simpler than aggregates for each (publisher,
campaign) pair.
2) Controllability: A natural question that arises in any
state space based dynamical system is if it is possible to
drive the system from any initial state to any final state via
a (finite) sequence of inputs (i.e., controllability [11]). In
our setup, at least two factors make the system inherently
uncontrollable: (i) finite advertiser budget, and (ii) variability
in the volume of ad requests from a publisher. As a result,
we cannot employ any generic control system which assumes
controllability. However, some states are reachable from any
initial state, and hence our setup satisfies a weaker version of
controllability called reachability [11]. The challenging part in
our setup is to drive a (publisher, campaign) pair to a desirable
state to eventually meet our objectives.
3) State based bid and cost updates: To drive the current
state of a (publisher, campaign) pair to desirable states, a
simple strategy is to have additive updates to the bid and
cost depending on the current state. In this paper, we consider
additive bid and cost updates of the following form:
bidi,j,t = bidi,j,t + κbidfm (mˆj,t) bidi,j,t, (1)
costi,j,t = costi,j,t+(
1 + κβfβ
(
βˆi,t
))
κηfη (ηˆi,t) costi,j,t, (2)
where κbid, κβ , and κη are constants. Discrete functions fm(·),
fβ(·), fη(·) map the quantized versions of current margin
(mˆj,t), leftover budget fraction (βˆi,t), and current efficiency
(ηˆi,t) to discrete values. For further simplification, we assume
that: (i) fβ(βˆi,t) = βˆi,t, and (ii) the range (i..e, the discrete
set of possible output values) of fm(·) and fη(·) is fixed
for our setup (determined using domain knowledge). For
example, the set of possible output values for fm(·) could
be {−1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1}. Hence, the remaining task at hand is
basically to ’learn’ which state should map to which output
value for functions fm(·) and fη(·), so that our end goals
are met; this is precisely what we cover in Section IV. For
consistency with standard methods in the online advertising
industry [3], [4], [10], we assume that, before each update,
the bid equals eCPM (= Target CPI×pCVR×pCTR) and cost
equals Target CPI×pCVR; note that the pCVR and pCTR can
vary for each display opportunity due to differences in features
derived from the campaign, publisher and online user [10].
IV. Q-LEARNING
In general, there are two ways one can go about learning
functions fm(·), and fη(·) described in Section III-B3. One
way is to mimic the entire RTB setup via a state transition
model, and optimize fm(·), and fη(·) around it. But building
such a complex model is not practically feasible, and the
learnt fm(·), and fη(·) would seriously suffer from modelling
errors. Another way is a model free approach, e.g., Q-learning
which learns fm(·), and fη(·) directly from past decisions
and outcomes. In Section IV-A, we describe the proposed Q-
learning algorithm for our setup; this is followed by a detailed
description of the associated Q-learning reward function in
Section IV-B.
A. Q-learning
As mentioned in Section III-B3, at each update step, we take
a compound action (in the form of changes in bid and cost).
Due to the discrete nature of the functions fm(·), and fη(·),
there are only a finite number of actions that can be taken in
each state. Thus, if there are am possible values for fm(·),
and aη possible values for fη(·), there are am × aη possible
actions a ∈ A (i.e., the action space which is the product of )
for any state s ∈ S = Sm×Sη×SB . The standard Q-learning
update step [9] can now be stated in our context as follows:
Q (st, at) = (1− α)Q (st, at)
+ α
(
R (t) + γmax
a∈A
Q (st+1, a)
)
, (3)
where st and at represent the state and action at time t, Rt
is the reward at time t, αt is the learning rate, and γ is
the forgetting factor, and A is the space of possible actions.
At each time, the bidder selects an action, and observes the
corresponding reward (to be defined in Section IV-B), and
then updates the Q value. We describe below some important
properties associated with this update in our context.
1) Learning rate and forgetting factor: The learning rate αt
determines to what extent the newly acquired information is
weighed in comparison to the old information. Theoretically,
a decaying αt ensures convergence, but results in very slow
convergence rates, hence a small but constant value of αt
suffices. The forgetting factor γ ∈ [0, 1] determines the
importance of incorporation of future rewards. A low γ makes
the agent myopic as it then considers only current rewards,
while γ close to 1 makes the agent strive for long-term high
rewards.
2) Exploration vs. exploitation: Note that the maximization
step in (3), i.e., max
a∈A
Q (st+1, a) is a greedy procedure. The
convergence of the algorithm depends on the balance between
exploration and exploitation. To converge faster, a natural step
is to resort to an -greedy policy, where with probability 1− 
one chooses the ’max’ action in (3), and with probability  one
chooses a random action from the action spaceA. In particular,
we resort to Boltzmann sampling [9] in our setup. This means
that, during exploration, the probability of selection an action
given a state, is given by p (a|s) = exp (Q (s, a) /θ)∑
a′ exp (Q (s, a
′) /θ)
,
where the temperature parameter θ , is decayed slowly over
time so as to slowly reduce the exploration. In addition, the
learning rate α can be chosen in a systematic way for different
states, so as to quicken the learning pace for states which are
not visited often.
3) Deterministic vs. stochastic policy: It is crucial to learn a
deterministic policy for our setup, as a stochastic policy might
result in states drifting off from the actual objective.
Once the Q-learning algorithm converges, the best
action corresponding to a given state is given by
arg maxa∈AQ (s, a).
B. Q-learning: Reward Functions
Given the state space example in Figure 2, the following
challenges are encountered while designing a suitable reward
function for Q-learning.
1) Unobservable spend and cost: Keeping in mind a large
scale setup with many publishers and campaigns, we assume
that the bidder maintains data only at a publisher and campaign
granularity. This means, the bidder tracks only publisher-
wise spend across all campaigns, and campaign-wise cost
and installs across all publishers. The bidder does not track
publisher-wise spend at a campaign-level, or the advertiser-
wise cost and installs at a publisher level. This brings in some
sense of unobservability regarding the effectiveness of cost
and bid update actions in our setup. For instance, the margin
of a publisher is affected by all bid and cost update actions
undertaken for all campaigns associated with the publisher.
Similarly, the efficiency of a campaign is affected by all
bid and cost update actions involving publishers where the
campaign is being bid for. Hence, a suitable reward function
should be able to attribute margin and efficiency changes of a
publisher and campaign respectively to individual actions.
2) Sparse and delayed rewards: The transition of a pub-
lisher’s margin from a negative margin state to a neu-
tral/positive margin state in the interval of two consecutive
actions is usually very unlikely. Similarly, the efficiency of a
campaign is unlikely to change in the interval of two consec-
utive actions. The transition is brought about by a sequence
of actions, rather than just an action. Hence, a suitable reward
function should reward actions through intermediate rewards
rather than only on change of state, i.e., it should reward the
change in margin and efficiency of a publisher and campaign
respectively.
Keeping the above points in mind, we propose a reward
function of the following form:
R (mj,t, ηi,t, bidi,j,t, costi,j,t)
= (1− λ)κrmj ,i,t (mj,t −mj,t−1) + λκrηi,j,t (ηi,t−1 − ηi,t) ,
(4)
where κrmj ,i,t and κrηi,j,t are weights which map the
amount of attribution to be assigned to the compound actions
(bidi,j,t, costi,j,t), and hyper-parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] trades-off
the importance given to change in margin versus the change
in efficiency. In particular, κrmj ,i,t =
Bi − costi,t∑N
l=1Bl − costl,t
, and
κrηi,j,t =
spendj,t∑M
l=1 spendl,t
. The weight κrηi,j,t incorporates the
spend ratio of the publisher j as compared to the total spend,
into the reward, and hence tries to approximately attribute the
cause of change of ηi,t−1 to ηi,t to the compound action local
to publisher j and campaign i. Similarly, κrmj ,i,t incorporates
the ratio of the budget of campaign i as compared to the
total unutilized budget, into the reward and hence tries to
approximately attribute the cause of change of mj,t−1 to mj,t
to the compound action local to publisher j and campaign i.
The reward function proposed in (4) not only considers both
the objectives of our setup, but also rewards actions at each
step.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss experimental results based on
data from mobile app install campaigns managed by Yahoo
Gemini [3]. The state space was quantized as follows: 4 bins
for efficiency with efficiency threshold  = 0.2, 3 bins for
margin, 4 bins for left-over budget. The cardinality of range of
functions fm(·) and fη(·) was set to 8 and 14. We considered
a sample of 183 publishers and 400 campaigns. Our training
data covered one week of impression level data spanning
the selected publishers and campaigns, and the testing data
covered the following week. The policy evaluations were
carried out using the RTB simulator that we describe in
Appendix A. The baseline for the performance improvements
stated below is a PI controller [7] just optimizing for the
margin.
Margin-efficiency tradeoff: As shown in (4), the hyper-
parameter λ in the reward function provides a way to trade-
off performance lifts in margin versus the number of happy
campaigns. Table I, clearly shows this performance trade-off
(as well the budget utilization) for different values of λ. Note
that λ = 0 corresponds to a policy which focuses only on
margin improvements, while at the other extreme, λ = 1
corresponds to a policy focused on efficiency improvement.
Figure 3 shows the trade-off between lift in margin versus the
λ ∆spend % ∆margin % ∆budget util. % ∆happy %
0 −7.65 610.43 71.57 −17.23
0.1 −4.01 533.38 67.05 −12.18
0.2 −0.07 461.97 63.99 −7.56
0.3 4.72 377.06 59.52 0.00
0.4 7.83 326.42 56.68 5.88
0.5 10.98 272.07 53.92 12.18
0.6 11.52 250.53 50.29 13.87
0.7 12.14 170.65 38.70 15.13
0.8 12.81 73.25 24.28 15.97
0.9 13.37 −17.58 10.61 16.81
1 14.05 −115.83 −4.27 17.65
TABLE I
VARIATION IN % LIFTS IN OVERALL SPEND, OVERALL MARGIN, OVERALL
BUDGET UTILIZATION, AND NUMBER OF HAPPY CAMPAIGNS FOR
DIFFERENT VALUES OF λ.
lift in number of happy campaigns; it also shows there is a
sweet spot on the curve where a bidder might like to operate
(leading to good margin without much efficiency loss).
Fig. 3. Trade-off between optimizing for margin versus optimizing for
number of happy campaigns. As shown, after a sweet spot on the trade-off
curve, the efficiency starts falling drastically.
Discussion: In our experiments, we observed that driving
the margin and efficiency of a (publisher,campaign) pair to a
favorable state becomes relatively easier with higher number
of publishers and campaigns. It is interesting to note that the
campaigns which start off as being unhappy have a higher
chance of turning happy if bid for in multiple different pub-
lishers. Campaigns which are bidded in only a few publishers,
and are unhappy to start with, are less likely to be turned to
happy campaigns. The above observation leads to the question:
how many publishers does a campaign need to be bid in,
so as to be controllable, i.e., the efficiency of that campaign
can be driven from any state to any desired state? This is
indeed a question that needs further exploration and is of
practical interest. We believe our state space approach provides
a reasonable framework for pursuing such questions, and our
Q-learning approach is able to capture the performance trade-
offs (e.g., efficiency vs. margin maximization) inherent to the
setup.
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APPENDIX
A. RTB simulator
A crucial part of the experiment section is a policy evaluator
which emulates the RTB platform closely. Next, we describe
the policy evaluator which consists of an RTB simulator. The
details of the RTB simulator are as follows.
Auction granularity level: We keep the auction granularity
level to one minute, i.e., we assume that the bidding
process takes place once in a minute. For each publisher,
the bidder seeks the campaign with the maximum eCPM
bid. For the next minute, we assume that for a publisher,
the campaign with the highest eCPM bid is selected by
the bidder for the entire minute.
Bid and cost update: We update the bids and costs of a
particular campaign in a publisher, once in an hour and
we update only those campaigns which won the auction
in the last hour. To be particular, the compound action of
updating the bids and costs of campaigns across different
publishers is taken once in an hour.
Campaign selection: During the auction process, we only
pick campaigns which have at least 10 installs in our data
set, so as to ensure we use campaigns which have fairly
well estimated pCTR and pCVR values.
Bid landscape: The bidding landscape for each section is
simulated as a sigmoid function of the form:
P (win|bid) = 1
1 + aefloorprice−bid
,
where a’s are drawn from an uniform distribution for each
publisher at the beginning of the simulator. If the bid is
lower than the floor price, the win rate is allocated to
be zero. The sigmoid function abstracts the chances of
higher win rates with increasing bids. The floorprice is
extracted from historical data for each publisher.
pCTR and pCVR values: We assume that we have a
good estimate of pCTR and pCVR values for each (pub-
lisher,campaign) instance, where the pCTR and pCVR
data is collected from historical data as the average pCTR
and pCVR values over a period of one week.
Budget Consideration: We assign budgets to each cam-
paign based on the past advertiser cost of each campaign.
The advertiser cost of a campaign is a conservative
estimate of the budget. However, it ensures, the budget
estimate of a campaign is realistic as advertiser cost is
less than the budget for a campaign.
Discrete Policy: The policy learnt, and hence evaluated,
is discrete at all levels. The policy is discrete in terms of
efficiency, leftover budget and, margin. Discrete policies
are expected to work better with more discretization of
the state space (at the cost of higher complexity).
